Akademik

   Officially known as the Russian Ground Forces (sukhoputnyie voiska Rossiiskoi federatsii), the army in its current form dates to 1992 when a plan to maintain a joint military among the various members of the Commonwealth of Independent States broke down; however, the Russian army has a long historical tradition associated with both its Soviet and tsarist heritage. The Ground Forces are currently commanded by General of the Army Vladimir Boldyrev, who replaced Alexey Maslov in 2008.

   The primary responsibility of the army is to defend the Russian Federation from aggressors as well as retain occupied territory. The major units include motorized rifle troops, tank troops, rocket forces and artillery, and special units. The Ground Forces were formed during a chaotic period shaped by the large-scale withdrawal of military units from the former Warsaw Pact members (1989–1991) and Newly Independent States (1991–1993) that formerly comprised the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The Russian army, however, still maintains a peacekeeping presence in a number of former Soviet states, including Tajikistan, Moldova, and the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Since 1991, it has served in small numbers in Croatia, Bosnia, Lebanon, and sub-Saharan Africa.

   Immediate post-Soviet plans for reform were complicated by conflicting opinions among the leadership over the role and purpose of the army in a post–Cold War environment. The constitutional crisis of 1993 did little to improve the image of the new force as it was drawn into a political dispute between Boris Yeltsin and members of the Congress of People’s Deputies. Shortly thereafter, Yeltsin initiated the disastrous first Chechen War. The army’s performance in the conflict was universally lambasted. The Ground Forces’ difficulty in taking the capital Grozny, abuses of civilian populations, criminal behavior including selling weapons to insurgents, and numerous desertions of soldiers diminished the army’s reputation in the country at large.

   A series of reforms instituted in 1997 did little to improve the situation as resources were siphoned away from the basic needs of the army (most notably, the abolition of the Ground Forces Headquarters) in favor of special units and detachments. Under Vladimir Putin, the headquarters was reinstituted and military spending increased for the first time in years; however, the army continues to suffer from significant social and financial issues. As a result of positive changes, the army performed comparatively well during its 2008 deployment in the South Ossetian War with Georgia. Due to its legacy as a conscript army serving the interests of a quasi-totalitarian society, the culture of leadership leaves much to be desired. Economic demands placed on young officers, who are poorly paid, exacerbates this situation.

   Hazing of younger recruits, known in Russian as dedovshchina>, is rampant and results in significant numbers of injuries and suicides on an annual basis. Currently, about one-half of the army’s 400,000 personnel are conscripts, each serving a one-year term. Most conscripts come from the provinces or from underprivileged families, as wealthier Russians normally avoid conscription through university deferments, spurious medical documents, or other means. The laws and conscription practices have been tightened under Dmitry Medvyedev, with many young men who fail to report for conscription facing imprisonment.

   Women, who are not conscripted, make up about 10 percent of the army. The poorly paid contract soldiers, known as kontraktniki, tend to be of low quality, often joining the army as a last resort when they have failed at other careers. Despite the current situation, Russia’s military planners hope to raise the number of volunteer soldiers to 70 percent in the near future.

   See also Air Force; Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia; Navy.